A BANQUET OF Essayes,

Fetcht out of Famous

OWENS CONFECTIONARY,

Dishit out, and serv'd up at the

TABLE OF MECOENAS.

By *HENRY HARFLETE*, sometime of *Grayes-Inne*, Gent.

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1653.

To the Right

WORSHIPFUL,

And my much honoured

Friend & *Kinſman*,

SIR,

CHRISTOPHER HARFLETE,

Knight.

Sir,

YOur former favours oblige me to a votal, *if not* total *requital, at leaſt to an acknowledgement, though't be but in this ſlight* Commemoration, *and ſo near*

alliance may command this Dedi-
cation. I might have elected ſome
titular *Protector to cheriſh this*
weak Infant *of my* Braine; *but*
I content my ſelf with an inferiour
choiſe, deſiring your ſelf my tu-
telar Patron. *Accept of theſe*
my poor labours, which were the
ſelected object of my Meditations,
on purpoſe to keep me from idle-
neſſe, the mother of all miſchief.
That excellent ſaying of St Hie-
rome *egg'd me on to theſe Medi-*
tations: Aliquid operis facito,
ut te Diabolus inveniat occu-
patum; non enim facilè capitur
à Diabolo, qui bono vacat exer-
citio: *Be alwayes doing ſome-*
thing, that ſo the Devil may finde
thee imployed; for he is not eaſi-

ly

ly caught in the Devils ſnare, who is well buſied. Sir, were there not Lectores *who be* Lictores, *or could all my Readers be free from the aſperſion of* critically cenſo-rious, *I could well afford to imi-tate my Author; Commend my book to the Reader, and my ſelf to you: however let it be ſo, I'le expoſe my ſelfe to charitable judgements, and venture it.*

Inveniat noſter Patronum ut ubiq; libellus,
Librum Lectori dedico, mèq; tibi.

Your Worſhips affectionate Friend and Kinſman to command,

HENRY HARFLETE.

HENRY HARRIET.

A

BANQUET

OF

Essayes:

Upon these verses. *Ex. lib. 1. Ep. 2.*

Qui legis ista, tuam reprehendo, si mea laudas.
Omnia, stultitiam: sic nihil, invidiam.

ESSAY. I.

Of Reading, Understanding and Practising.

[*Qui legis.*]

THE World is now so *laden* and *larded* with *Learning*, as that its not only *fatigated* with the *burden* of it; but also its *fascinated* (shall I say *fatuated*) with *such* a *supposed* *felicity*, as that *it loathes* the *life* of it too, that's

1. *Qui legis.* Worldly men account learning a burden.

that's *action*. *Reading* is like the *body*, *Understanding* like the *apparel*, and *Practising* like the *soule*: The *body* of *reading* being mortal, cannot but quickly meet with a *dissolution*, did not the *soule* of *Practice animate* it, the *apparel* of the *Understanding keeping* it from the *frigid*, and *defending* it from the *torrid aire*; *that* from *obscuration*, *this* from *oblatration*. For *Writings* might quickly espy a *Momus*, did not the *backbiter* eye an *understanding MECOENAS*, ready to defend the Authors quarrel, forcing him to *praise*, if not *practise* what he *reads*, though he never *read* to *praise* or *practise*, but to *traduce*.

[*Qui legis.*]

Well may the *World* be reported *Spherical*, in that it's *vertical*, even so cloyed with a number of *giddy-headed readers*, as that it *surfets* with their *issue*, *doctrine*; so that they *loath* that which they should *love*, *Preaching*. Ever since our *Bacchanalian* tospots have scorned our *Ecclesiastical* despots, obliging their *devotion* to the *temple* of *Baccus*; the *Pulpit* with them hath been counted a *reproach*: and no marvel; for they have turned the *current*

of

of their *devotion* another way, making their *belly* their *god*; the *Drawer* or *Tapster*, their *Priest*; the *Barre*, his *Pulpit*; the *Taverne* or *Ale-house*, their *Temple*; their *wine* or *Ale*, their *Spirit*; their *Stomack*, their *Altar*; their several sorts of *Drinks*, their *Graces*; their *belchings* or *spewings*, their *prophecies or knowledge*; and the best book they delight to lay open before them to read in, is their *Hostesse* or her fine *Daughter*.

The late booke to tolerate playes and pastimes upon the Lords day liked them well.

[*Qui legis.*]

Time was, when the *Church* had many *Practisers*, but few *Readers*; *time is*, that a *contradictory position* being laid in the *balance* of the *Sanctuary* makes up this *proposition*, That this now *Church* hath many *Readers*, few *Practisers*.

The *Primitive Catechumenists* heard, and *practised*; but our *Moderne Mythologists hear* and *read*, but *practise* not.

The *Church* in her *Infant-cradle* might glory in the number of her *Rockers* (if I may so terme them,) but in this her *Maturity* she may well *condole* the *penury* of her *lazy rockers*; and who be they? but her *learned Readers*. The *world* now doth boast in *Knowledge*, and scornes to take the paines to make a double *journey*

to the *Temple* on the *Sabbath*, unleſſe it be either for cuſtomes ſake, or as the women came to the *Theater*, according to the *Poet*,

Spectatum veniunt, veniunt ſpectentur ut ipſæ.

So theſe come to be *ſeers*, not to hear their *Seer*, or perchance to be ſeen, rather then to be taught; and why? either 1. *Self-conceit* perſwades them, that they know already as much as the *Preacher* can tell them; or 2. Elſe *blinde devotion* ſtrikes in them this opinion, that they have done God good ſervice to viſite his Temple once a day; or 3. Their *learned ignorance* would conceive that for an *undeniable Orthodox*, which graver *judgements* have cenſured for a *palpable Paradox*, even that *Reading* is better then *preaching*. What though St. *Auguſtine* was converted by *reading* ſome part of the thirteenth chapter of St. *Paul* to the *Romanes*? Wilt thou therefore conclude that the *word read* doth out-poiſe the *word Preached* in the *balance* of *profit*? Thou readeſt the proverb, and believeſt it, that *Una hirundo non facit ver: One ſwallow makes not Summer*: In all this conceive me aright, though *I commend Preaching*, yet

yet *I condemne* not *Reading*; for both be excellent. It is a rule in *Rhetorick* given from that great Orator *Cicero* concerning *compariſons*, that *Neceſſe non eſt in rebus comparandis, ut alteram vituperes ſi alteram laudes.* The law of reaſon cannot impoſe this neceſſity upon *compariſons*, that the praiſing of one part ſhould derogate any thing from the worth of the other. Nay let me ground this *poſition* upon the *rock* of *truth* fetcht out of the *quarry* of great St. *Chryſoſtome*, *Negligentia legendo eget diligentiâ prædicando*; becauſe the Reader is negligent he wants the Preachers diligence. I cannot but admire at the fooliſhneſſe of ſome in the managing of their ſtates, who neglect *Preaching*, and buy *damnation* with *Reading*: For what is it available for a man to be accounted *learned* and *judicious*, and then after death go to hell for want of *Practice?*

Tull. *lib.* 2 *ad* Heren.

Chryſoſt. *Hom.* 3. *in* 2. Theſſal.

He that *reads* and *underſtands* not, is like the *Parrot*, who may utter a perfect *Orthology*, yet is ignorant of the true *Aitiology*, or true meaning of the words ſpoken; and ſurely no wiſer is that man, *qui legit & non intelligit*, who *reads* and *underſtands* not: would you *ſtell* a reaſon

for it, then put them two together, and you have it, *legere & non intelligere est negligere*: To *read* but not with the *intellect*, is to neglect: But he that *understands* and *practiseth* not, is like that proud *Silke-worme*, who enrobes himself in gorgeous array, rather to attract personall reverence, and worldly esteem, then to protect his naked corps from the fury of the frigid element. *Hic seipsum vestit, ut sciatur: ille legit, ut tantum sciat & sciatur.* The one is gorgiously invested, that he may be known; the other *reads* only to know, and that's curiosity, and that for knowing he may be known, and that's *vanity*; his aime is to informe his minde, not to reforme his manners. *Science* is a labour, to the accomplishment of which both the *Theorick* and *Practick* must (like *Hippocrates's* twins) both hand and heart, both head and bed together: This *Theoretical* labour may be thus bimembred, *in laborem Disciplinæ & exercitii.* 1. *Disciplinæ, ut quæ nescit, discat.* 2. *Exercitii, ut quæ didicit, ad usum ducat*: There is the labour of, 1. Discipline; and 2. Exercise. 1. Of Discipline, that he may learne what he knowes not; and of, 2. Exercise, that he may practise what he hath learned. This

This World is a Sea, upon which the *theoretical reader* floates in the pinnace of ſelf-opinionated pride, driven with the winde of *vaine-glory*; in which the *Practical underſtander* is ſurely drowned: for he never returned home, ſince he hoiſted ſaile for *New-England*: Miſtake me not! I know there be many true and zealous Profeſſours in *England*, who have not in theſe corrupted times bowed the knee to *Baal*; but I ſpeak this as bewailing the loſſe and miſſe of thoſe Paſtors and zealous Profeſſours, who (I know whileſt they lived amongſt us) were both *Luces* and *Duces*, pure lights, and ſure guides; lights for *Diſcipline*, guides for *Practice*. Rev. 4. 6.

ESSAY.

ESSAY. II.

Of Bookes.

2. Ista. *Qui legis ista.*]

GOod *Bookes* should be the *Object* of every good mans eye: idle and lascivious pamphlets are correspondent to the life of idle Christians: For those *Books* which handle a *subject*, whose *doctrine* is far remote from the use and practice of a Christian life, are a true token of an idle Author, and the *readers* of them are like to *common fidlers*, who undertake the use of an *Instrument*, onely to keep them from a *trade* more laborious and profitable; laborious in the Work, profitable to the Workers.

[*Ista.*]

The *Printers Presse* is like unto the World, where are bad men as well as good? And *Inve-*

Invenies paucos hîc, ut in orbe, bonos.

Where I finde ſome good Books, many bad; what do I then? I do (like good men in chuſing their companions) elect the good, reject the bad: I uſe that, refuſe this. Good conſorts are worth my acquaintance, and good Books my peruſall; my paines may countervaile my profit, if I read them, through-read them, re-read them.

Doth a man delight in reading vicious and laſcivious Authors? I wrong him not if I ſtile him an *Aſtronomer*, who chiefly fixeth the eye of his *meditation* upon the wandring *Venerean Planet*; but now adayes a man may eaſily finde out the greateſt *Students* in this *ſcience*. Young men and maides are growne ſtudious *Scholars* in *LOVES Schoole*: Amorous pamphlets make up their Library, who having their Love-ſongs *ad unguem*, long to be *graduates* in the *Univerſity* of *Venus*; they account themſelves already Maſters in this Art *in actu deſignato*, and think long till they be ſo *in actu exercito*; nothing now in their judgements is wanting to compleat their degree, but a *Pone manum in manum maritæ*.

The reading of ſuch Authors is the true em-

embleam of their vicious mindes.

It is a received opinion, that *Vultus est index animi:* The countenance is the discoverer of the minde; and it is as true, that the reading of Books may anatomize the heart; Lascivious Books may call their Readers lascivious without the least aspersion of a wrong.

Doth a man fixe the heart of his delight upon good and godly Bookes, and make them the delight of his heart, it is an invincible argument of a vertuous minde. An humble and a lowly heart loves Books which teach the lesson of humility; and by *Augustines* leave a man may, (nay if he do not first) profit *legendo*, by reading, he can scarce gaine any thing *cogitando*, by meditating; and though there be profit to be sucked out of both, yet I must confesse, that the greater fruit is gathered from the *Tree* of *contemplation*, though not alwayes the fairer. *Rachel* was more faire then *Leah*, but yet (to make some amends,) *Leah* was more fertil then *Rachel*.

Auguſt Ep. ad Paulinum; he saith there, *Homines plus proficiunt cogitando, quàm legendo.*

Contemplation hath a two-fold accesse: *unus in intellectu, alter in affectu: unus in lumine, alter in favore: unus in acquisitione, alter in devotione*: The one in the intellect,

Bernard in Cant. Serm. 49.

tellect, the other in the affect. The order of *Nature* calls up the Intellect in the first place: for a man can never love that which he knowes not, and how comes he by the knowledge of it? but by one of these three meanes,

either by { 1. Hearing, 2. Seeing, or 3. Reading.

Shall I go yet further, and perswade you that *Reading* is a kinde of *Meditation*? if not I, then *Hugo*, who saith that there be three kindes of *Meditations*, Hugo *in Medit. suis.*

viz. in { 1. *Creaturis.* 2. *Scripturis.* 3. *Moribus.*

Primum } *surgit ex* { *admiratione.*
Secundum } *surgit ex* { *lectione.*
Tertium } *surgit ex* { *circumspectione.*

Admiratio generat quæstionem, quæstio investigationem, investigatio inventionem. Lectio ad cognoscendam veritatem materiam ministrat, meditatio coaptat, oratio sublevat, operatio componit, & contemplatio in ista exultat. Thus *Hugo*.

A Meditation in the { Creatures. Scriptures. Manners.

Shall I call these three, three severall Books, in which a man may read *Heaven?*

Meditatio in 1. *Creaturis.* The first ariseth from *Admiration*, whose posterity proclaimes her fruitful; for *Admiration* begets a *question*; and *asking*, *seeking*; and *seeking* a *finding*.

2. *Scripturis.* The second ariseth from *Reading*, and that's not *steril* too: for it is a trusty guide to bring us to the knowledge of the truth.

The third ariseth from *Circumspection*, and that's fruitlesse neither: for it plaies two wayes *in* and *out*; *Discurrit intùs & foràs*; *intùs ad conscientiam*, *foràs ad famam*; that is, *in* upon the *conscience*, *out* upon the good *name* of a man.

Of all companions Books be the secretest, there a man may solace himselfe, and yet heares nothing but the Echo of his own words.

Of all Glasses Books be the best; for they being *inspective*, are both { 1. *Prospective*, 2. *Reflective*, & 3. *Illuminativa*.

Three

Three chief uſes for Glaſſes.

BOOKS (like glaſſes) are,

First *Proſpective*, making things afarre off, ſeem near at hand; and therefore we ſay, that a learned man ſees farther then an ignorant; ſees farther, though not *oculo* Σώματος, yet Φρονήματος, though not with the eye of his body, yet with the eye of his minde: ſo he ſees farther, becauſe he knowes more. 1. *Proſpect.*

Secondly, *Reflective*; were not the Reader blear-ey'd he might quickly eſpy the lineament of his own ſoul in theſe Glaſſes by reflection; let him be but intentive in reading, and he may quickly collect the diſpoſition of his own ſoule, and the diſeaſe being once known puts the patient in hope of a cure. In theſe Glaſſes the proud dame may ſee her painted face, and ſuperficialized ſoule; her envious eye, and contumelious tongue; her impudent fore-head, and immodeſt countenance. In theſe Glaſſes the Altar-Prieſt enrobed in his veſtry veſtments may ſee is own picture, 2 *Kings* 10. there he may ſee the worſhippers of *Baal* attired in *Baals* veſtments, and at laſt their idolatrous veſtments (by the command of *Jehu*) hewn off their ſhoulders with the edge 2. *Reflect.*

edge of the sword. In these Glasses the Persecutor may see the Whore of *Babylon* surfeited with the blood of the Saints, *Rev.* 17. 6. and at length the righteous GOD avenging the blood of his servants at her hand, *Rev.* 19. 2.

In a word, in these Glasses every sinful man may see the Anatomy of his own sinful soul, and GODS definitive judgement for the same without timely repentance, *Rev.* 21. 8.

3. *Illuminative.*

Thirdly, *Illuminative.* Good Books (like Glasses)

do { 1. Enlighten the house of the heart, and keep out the { 2. Dust of { Pride and Hypocrisie. 3. Winde of vain-glory.

Qui legis ista.]

The Printers Presse is like unto a Garden, where are stinking weeds, as well as sweet-smelling flowers; what do I then? I do (like fine-handed dames) pick up the flowers, kick at the weeds. I grace my hand with the one; but I can scarce afford, that my eye or foot should grace the other; mine eye by a *speculation*, or my foot by an *inculcation*.

ESSAY.

ESSAY. III.

Of Application.

Quilegis iſta, tuam. 3. *Tuam.*

APplication is the life of Doctrine: It is a ſtrong perſwaſion to converſion. It was a *Symbole* of *Aurelius Numerianus*, Eſto quod audis, *Be what you hear.* To which I may adde, Eſto quod legis; *Be what thou readeſt:* or lead thy life according to that rule given in thy Book-Doctrine, and thou wilt (ſhall I ſay work a miracle?) put a living ſoul into a dead body, revive the dead letter by the ſpirit of Application.

In vain is Reprehenſion without Application; how fitly have the Greeks fitted it, calling it ἐφαρμονία from ἁρμω *apto*, to fit; for harmony is a ſweet and pleaſant Muſick, conſiſting of many notes, yet

yet none discord, but sweetly close together. If the Reader or Hearer apply not that which is read or heard by a religious life and conversation, there is a jarre or discord between the Confuter and Confuted, who denies the truth of the Doctrine in his irreligious practice; how sweetly then do the Writer and Reader, Preacher and Hearer accord, when the work of the one attends the word or pen of the other; when Obedience makes the Epilogue to the Writers Catalogue, when the one gives a Practical Amen to the others Theoreticall Doctrine?

[*Tuam.*]

Application is a kinde of Adaptation, and the Doctrine must be fitted for Application, as Taylors fit apparel for the body, neither too wide nor too strait; if it be too wide, it may draw the Reader or Hearer to a presumption or obduration; if it be too strait, it may perswade him to desparation.

[*Tuam.*]

Men write, because men are vicious, and

and vicious men should read to mend, that's the end of writing and reading too; but we do like *Taylors*, we are mending all the week, all the yeare, yea all our lives long, and yet not mended. We sit mending upon the Shop-board of this World, and forget that Hell is so near us, as under the Board; every time we commit a sinne, we throw a shred to Hell.

Our good actions are forgotten, assoon as gotten. The Worldling makes a journey to Church every Sabbath day, and sometimes heares the Word with the eares of attention, but could never finde the heart of retention; the Preacher may reply, but he never intends to apply: and sometimes Gods House may be a continent for his body, but his Counting-house shall be a repository for his minde; and so leaves his Religion where he found it; so that he ties Religion altogether to time and place, nay to his Holy-day-apparel too; he strips himself of his Holy-day-cloathes, and untires his Soul of devotion altogether.

Thus runs he posting to his native rest,
Forgets the Word, and takes it for a jest.

ESSAY. V.

Of Reprehension.

4. Reprehendo. *Qui legis ista, tuam reprehendo.*]

ETymologies may sometimes instruct, and without offence of me essayed to initiate an Essay of Reprehension.

1. The Latines. The Latines call it *Reprehensio*, from *re* and *prehensio*, a taking or pulcking back. Experience daily objects to our sight the untoward carriage of the home-bred or countrey-horse; who being altogether in the extreames, is either too dull and slow, or too quick and hasty; either too forward, or too backward; wherefore his Rider provides him both *calcar* and *frænum*, a spurre and a bridle; a spurre to prick him forward, when he is too backward; and a bridle to keep him back, when

when he is too forward. Me thinks the refractory will of man is like this untoward Horſe, who wants the ſpurre of exhortation to prick him forward to the performance of good, when he is dull and defective, and the bridle of dehortation or reprehenſion to refraine his forwardneſſe, when he runnes head-long into exorbitant courſes.

[—*Reprehendo.*—]

The Greeks likewiſe challenge an inſtruction by an Etymon in their verbal ſignifications. Reprehenſion by them is expreſſed by three ſignificant words. 2. The Greeks.

Viz.
1. ἐπιπληξις.
2. μέμψις.
3. ψόγος.

1. ἐπιπληξις,] or elſe πληγη, which word ſignifies, *plaga, ictus*, or *vulnus*, a wound or ſtroke. 'Tis true indeed, that the words of the reproover muſt be cutting to make them curing: ἐπιπληξις is derived from ἐπι *ſuper*, 1. Obſerv.

and πλῆξις *percuſſio*, a wounding or ſtriking upon the conſcience.

2. Obſerv. The powerful words of ſome Miniſters have ſtricken ſuch ſtrange effects into the conſciences of ſome weak Chriſtians, as that they have been no ſmall provocation to deſpaire; and deſperation muſt have ſome pleaſing object, though it work to the confuſion of the weak ſubject, unleſſe the power of Gods hand in his Majeſty prevent the intended miſchief of Satans head in his malice.

2. μέμψις,] which word ſignifies *querimonia*, *expoſtulatio*, or *accuſatio*, a complaint, expoſtulation, or accuſation, uttered in ſome *querimonious dialect*. The Latine may enable the word to beare the burden of this ſenſe; expreſſing it to be the ſame with *accuſare*, and *incuſare*; making ſome difference in reſpect of the perſonall object of reprehenſion (onely) according to the old verſes of that ancient Grammarian, JOHANNES de GARLANDIA.

Johannes de Garlandia. in l. de Synonim.

Dicitur accuſans æquales atque minores
Dicitur incuſans majores & meliores.

T

The Commentary expounds it thus, *accuſare eſt culpare, incuſare eſt reprehendere*; we accuſe, and thereby blame our equals and inferiours; we incuſe, and thereby reprehend the crimes and faults of our ſuperiours, and thoſe who are of a greater eſtate and higher degree: ſo that the Commenter himſelf would acknowledge ſome difference between the two words, *à parte præpoſitionis*, which is *pars ſecundaria*, but none at all *à parte verbi*, which is *pars principalis*; they be the very words of the Commenter.

Galfrid: Comment. in lib. Synon. Johan. de Garlandia.

The reall object then of a reprehenſory complaint or accuſation, is *crimen*, a fault or offence, and the perſonal object is *reus*, or the party offending, who is the party tranſgreſſing, or the party accuſed, to whom muſt be added a third perſon, and that's the perſon offended. Now the offence or ſin being committed againſt God, the reprover by his reproof doth tacitely complain of the reprehended to God, the reproved therefore without amendment, is inexcuſable.

In the reprehenſions of ſome vices, ſome have been *facetious*, where they might have been more *querulous*, bewailing the unhappy eſtate of thoſe, who have been

so corrupted, that they need correption; but indeed such is the ridiculous nature of sin, as that derision best fits the seat of conviction. The Devil sports with that which man acts with pleasure; for when man sins, the Devil sings.

2. ψόγος,] from ψέγω, which signifies to dispraise, blame, or reproach, as well as to reprehend. But you will say, is Reproof a Reproach? I answer, It is so *effective, non entitativè*: effectively, because it reproves sin, whose effect is reproach; not entitatively in it self; for it reproaches not the reproved, but labours to abrogate the reproveds reproach.

Object. *Answ.*

Thus for the *Etymology*: the *Tropology* must follow, shewing the true nature of this *Psogology*.

——*Reprehendo.*——

The meanest apprehension can never be expert in the right learning of Reprehension. Humane discretion blushes not to acknowledge it a great difficulty, to know how to reprehend aright. Ignorance may be a proud controuler, but never a good counsellour; yet reproof is

opus

opus citiùs notum quàm factum, a work ſooner known then done: ſo defective is the nature of man in this duty, if known.

Reprehenſion therefore muſt have

2 { 1. Guide, and 2. Companion.

1. A Guide, that's diſcretion.

2. A Companion, that's meekneſſe of ſpirit.

Firſt, it muſt have a guide, leſt it run into errour; diſcrerion muſt moderate reprehenſion: and it ſo orders it, that it be uttered in *amor*, not *rancor*, in *love*, not in *malice*. Malitious enmity muſt not reveale that which Chriſtian amity obligeth to conceale. 1. A Guide.

Malice was ever a good informer, but ever a bad reformer.

Love is a great mover, ſhe commonly ſpeaks and ſpeeds to effect. *Love* muſt rub up the conſcience of the Delinquent, touch it to the quick; it may be quickened by being twitted; but care muſt be had, leſt haſte makes waſte; leſt the reprover puts *unguem in ulcere*, (in *Plautus* his phraſe) his finger into the ſore, which

he doth when he makes a matter worse, which is bad enough already; which he doth either by a long and circumstantiall recapitulation of that which should be silenced, which is against the law of charity, or else by an addition of some new matter, which is against the rule of verity, which commands a man to speak nothing but the truth.

Discretion likewise brings the reprover to a fit time and place, when and where conveniently to reprove the offender; it must be no street-check, nor a high-way-broile.

Rash indiscretion should not call a whole heap of neighbours to be eare-witnesses to that which should be private. A temperate and timely *taciturnity* is equivalent to an oration, which tacitely implies, that unseasonable silence is consonant to (if not worse then) a mute, and sometimes connivency may match with religious policy; but if this connivence become habituall, it is as bad as indulgence, worse then cæcity. Not to reprove, is to approve, (yea to partake) of the others enormity; *permittere malum, est admittere*, a continual permitting of sin is no better then a consenting to it.

Dis-

Discretion likewise brings reproof to be acquainted with a brevity. A short speech commends the action, prolix and impertinent is the livery of a babler. When *Philip* of *Macedon* wrote to them of *Lyconia*, that *if* he entred their countrey, he would utterly overthrow them; he had a short answer returned to him in this one word, *if*; briefly reproving his bold supposition of victory depending upon the incertainty of his entry.

Secondly, Reprehension must have a companion, and that's meeknesse of spirit. It must be *mitis, non aspera*, affable, not satyrical. *Envy* and *Fury* must not transport the reprover beyond the bounds of *discretion*, lest he turne *mel amoris* into *fel amaroris*, the honey of love into the gall of bitternesse; his words may be sharpe, yet pleasant. *Discretion* must be involved in a *tartnes*, lest he become *corrosor* rather then *corrector*, a *batterer* not *better-er* by his words; he must not be like *Herodotus*, who never spake well to any nor of any; he must beno clamorous *Stentor*; reproving with such eager fiercenes and impetuous violence, as that there is *omnis correptio, nulla consolatio; omnis clamor, nullus amor*: all correction, no consolation; all speech,

2. Companion. Gal. 6. 1.

speech, but no love in it, whose behaviour bewrayes the want of charity, having zeale without knowledge, or knowledge without discretion. Reviling and railing must not be mistook for refuting. Sharp rebukes must be ushered by discretion. Entreaties, (which in their own nature amount to milde checks,) suite best to inferiority: that must be their subject, whose object must challenge authority. My close shall be by application to the married. Gentle entreaties must be the wives best oratory instead of sharp rebukes, sweetly closing them to a delinquent husbands heart, with so wise an application, as that no glozing flattery may seem to be inveloped in a kinde supplication. An exhortative invasion may compell an errours evasion, then she may gaine the praise, and he the profit: But if sometimes the heat of passion usher an invective, let an instructive be its attendant, that may somewhat allay the heat, though not altogether abolish the hate. The reprover must not *movere*, when *monere*, not move to displeasure, when monish to profit, therefore to prevent this danger, some sweet instruction should tread upon the heeles of a sharp *Reprehension*. In a word, *Let*

1 Tim. 5. 1.

Good counsell for the wife.

1 Tim. 5. 1.

every

every thing be done decently and in order, ſaith *Paul*. Now a Chriſtian is ſaid to do a thing *decently and in order*, when he doth a Chriſtian work in ſuch ſort as becomes a Chriſtian, and after ſuch a manner as rightly correſponds to ſuch a Chriſtian act or duty; ſo reproof is done decently, when done { 1. Diſcreetly. 2. Meekly.

And in order, when it is done according to our Saviours order and direction for brotherly correction; ſo that it muſt have a guide to uſher it, and a companion to uphold it, leſt it turne into furious malice, or into invious folly.

Whatſoever a man doth, being guided by diſcretion, he doth it not raſhly, but with *mature* deliberation and ſerious *preconſideration*. Reprehenſion then muſt have a diſcreet guide, leſt it run into folly; and a meek companion, leſt it gad to fury.

ESSAY.

ESSAY. V.

Of Writers and their Works.

Si mea. *Qui legis iſta, tuam reprehendo, ſin mea.*—

THe induſtrious writer is like the Bee, who gets *ſua*, but not *ſibi*.

Sic vos non vobis mellificatis apes.

So Bees do work, but for themſelves work not.

Both work for others benefit, and many times both are rewarded with cruelty for their paines; the one *per manûs violentiam*, the other *per linguæ virulentiam*;

tiam; the one ſuffers by the violence of the hand, the other by the virulence of the tongue. The object upon which their cruelty works, is the life, corporal of the one, civil of the other: for the one loſeth *formam*, even life it ſelf, which is *forma corporis*, called *anima*, the ſoul, *qua dat eſſe corpori*, which gives being to the body, ſay Philoſophers; the other loſeth *famam*, his good name, being moſt deſpitefully traduced by the tongue of the criticall detractour. Laſtly, the mediate inſtrument by which they exerciſe their cruelty, is by fire upon both, Phyſical or Naturall upon one, Meraphorical upon the other; for St. *James* calls the tongue a *Fire*.

—*Si mea.*—

The cenſorious Reader is ſo prejudicate in his opinion, as that being ſick of the ſplene, envy ſhall teach him to call that *alienum*, which the induſtrious Author may juſtly in his conſcience chriſten *meum*. I ſhould think my time very ill ſpent to ſtep over my threſhold to deſire ſuch envious Criticks to God-father any childe of mine own brinae.

—*Si*

——Si mea.——

I cannot but brand that envious censurer with the name of an ignominious detractor, who refuseth the work, because he knowes the Authour a man in the world no way famous, and therefore presently spits forth that verse of *Virgil*;

In vita Virgilii. *Hos ego versiculos feci, tulit alter honores;*

Another took the pains, and this man assumes to himself but onely the name of the work. Such a one will protest, 'tis *alienum*, of another mans writing; and why? but because he doth not think 'tis *suum*, part of his own meditations; but let such a one remember his Grammar instance, *Insipientis est dicere, Non putaram*: It is the part of a foole to say, I had not thought; and thus sometimes his paines and industry is neglected with a scornfull *Tush*: and why? but because the world doth not so much honour the man, as to whirle him about in the chariot of fame. The world frownes upon the man, and the

the Readers (the true borne children of the world) do ſo upon his matter, his works too; the father's rejected, ſmall hopes then that his childe ſhould have any better welcome.

—*Si mea.*—

Me thinks the ſame word [*mea*] doth enforce into my Meditations (as it were) an immortality inveloped in a mortality. For [*mea*] the iſſue of my braine may be a viſible, audible, when as [*meum*] my corps (being curtain'd by the earth,) may (untill the general Reſurrection) be bedded in duſt and aſhes; *Littera ſcripta manet*, the braines iſſue may ſurvive the father, yea after he be converted into *nihilum*, into his *Materia prima*, in the Philoſophers terme, even into that in which *Job* repented, *into duſt and aſhes*: and this comes ſomewhat near to the Politicks, who ſay, that a man is (as it were) eterniz'd in that golden line of life, the line of his poſterity.

—*Si*

——*Si mea.*——

Mea, not *aliena*.

It shames that an industrious Student should behave himself so ill in his premeditated exercises, as that a former Writer should have just occasion to sue him (as it were) in a trover and conversion, as the Lawyers speak.

It is a token of great paines and industry in Writers to make those things [*sua*] their own, wich they write.

That Writer who steales here a piece out of one book, and there a piece out of another, is like unto a botching Taylor, who to patch up his broken clothes, opens his bell, (a place well known to unconscionable Taylors) and there he findes this piece which he stole from such a customer, and that piece from another, with which parings he makes his torne suite serviceable; but yet herein they differ, the one takes new shreds to mend an old garment, the other collects old meditations to patch up his new.

—*Si mea.*—

Omnia.—

If [*Mea*] be not [*Omnia mea,*] Discretion wills me to margent my Authours, that so the judgement of the Reader may distinguish *mea* from *omnia mea*, and I hope that may free me from the censure of thievery, and may almost perswade my self, that I shall not be arreigned at the barre of rash judgement before Judge *Zoilous* and *Momus* his brother-assistant, if I chance to borrow an antick authour, either to confirme my assertion, or to conferre some grace upon my conclusion, and promise to pay him again with an acknowledgement, though it be in a land skip, even as farre off as the margent room will reach.

ESSAY. VI.

Of Praise.

6. Laudat. *Qui legis ista, tuam reprehendo, si mea laudas.*

PRAISE not fitted to a right object, is like that winde which deceitfull butchers use to blow into their leane, ill-favoured meat; it may puffe up, and make it shew fairer to the eye, but it cannot better the taste. Praise my work or labour thou may'st; it may prove my humility, but it shall not pride my humanity.

——*Si mea laudas.*

Mea, not me.

Praise not my person. Personal proportion cannot be the true object of Praise;

Praise: A small fall may soon dash that. The world could never yet promise an enjoyment by a perpetuity; a new devise in law unknown, and therefore unpractised by the old world, because impossible to be obtained: for a broken leg, a broken arme, or a broken back may disjoynt thy praise, and then thou mayest be compelled to pause at that which before thou didst praise; now thou may'st have just occasion to condole that which before thou didst applaud.

——*Si mea laudas.*

Mea, not *quæ mei.*

Naturall endowments should neither be the objects of Praise. 'Tis for the fond over to praise such things in his beloved. Eccles.11.2

Forma bonum fragile est.——

Such endowments are given of God, but only to grace the temple of the Holy Ghost, and may be but of a small continuance; or else the conceit of men may differ in the judgement of an external pulchritude; *Quot homines, tot sententiæ;*

As many men, so many mindes, saith our English proverbe; for she may be faire in *oculo placiti*, who is not so in *oculo populi*; the Lover can praise his Mistresses beauty, when perhaps his friend knowes she's black, yet notwithstanding may be comely.

Amorous Poets mistake themselves, who in some curious Elegies and Sonnets praise their Mistresses beauty and perfections, on purpose to pride their natures, to prove their manners, and to procure their loves. This is to wooe *Venus* with *Cupids quiver*, carrying the fanne of Praise before their Mistresses, to keep the Sun of Humility from their painted faces.

——*Si mea laudas.*

Mea, not *quæ mihi.*

Riches do not make a man praise-worthy; they be *dona Dei data*, not *hominis innata*; they be *quæ mihi*, not *mea propria*; things given to me, not properly mine own: Man indeed enjoyes them but *ad voluntatem Domini*. God is his Land-lord, and man his Tenant (but) at will.

An *opifical* repute is correspondent to

tacit

tacite, but yet worldly applauſe; and I wonder much, why fine clothes and a full purſe (which perhaps may be a ſhrowd to vice) ſhould be more honoured then Vertue, Grace and Learning covered under a ragged veſtment.

'Tis folly to praiſe in *homine aliena*, and even mad folly to elevate a man upon the Pinacle of Admiration, *quia dives eſt*, becauſe he is rich. Riches are but mans ſervants, yet no covenant, no ſtatute-ſervants: man is not ſure of them a year, no, nor a day; he cannot indent with them for a certain Diary enjoyment; for they (like the *Indian* Bird) have wings to flie away, no feet to ſtand ſtill.

I cannot here but commemorate that worthy ſaying of an ancient Father to this purpoſe in hand: *Quid eſt quod dicis, Ego dives, ille pauper? Sarcinam tuam commemoras, pondus tuum laudas; taceas laudes tuas, qui miſerationes tuas non conſideras:* What's thou ſayeſt, I am rich, he is poor? thou do'ſt but commemorate thy heavy charge, and commend thy weighty burden. If thou didſt but conſider, that thou (though moneyed) deſerveſt rather to be pitied then praiſed,

thou would'ſt be ſilent in thine arrogant praiſes.

——— *Mea laudas.*

Not *mea laudo.*

A man muſt not praiſe his own work, that's ſelf-praiſe in an arrogant opinion of his own worth; how boldly then doth ſelf-conceit ſhrowd in the frontiſpice of his own work an implicite commendation in a

Commend me, or amend me?

——— *Si mea laudas.*

Mea, yet not *mea mala.*

My evil actions are not praiſe-worthy.

My evil acts muſt not be prais'd abroad,
For they (like ſmoke) do ſtop the breath of land.

So ſaith the Greek *Sententioniſt*,

Turpitudo & ſcelus laudem ſuffocat.

Μυσος ἡ αἰσχος ἐγκωμιον ἀγουσι.

If the actions of man may be compared to

to Fire. ſurely the evil in (or the deformity of) his actions may be the ſmoak which ſtops the mouth, or furres up the throat of charity, ſo as it cannot, (nay it may not) chant the praiſes of a friend or neighbour, becauſe by vicious acts degenerate, and ill-deſerving.

——*Si mea laudas.*

Mea, yet not *mea amatoria.*

Praiſe not my amatorious and wanton pamphlets; theſe indeed may gaine a little popular applauſe, and windy praiſes amongſt Satans lecherous poſterity, becauſe pleaſing to their carnal deſires; nay with ſome (it ſeem) the fiſh is already caught, one would think then 'tis time to hang aſide the nets; 'tis confeſt in plaine termes, in the very frontiſpice of ſome laſcivious ſtage-pamplets, vaunting that 'twas acted with much applauſe.

Theſe baſtard-medications are begotten between *Mars* and *Venus*; when Fancy hath helped *Venus* to deliver them, then doth the Printer wrap them up in their ſwadling-clouts, and then are they to ſome great Lord or Lady to God-fa—— honour them (I mean) with an accept-

ance; I, (and that which the Author implicitely prayes for in his Epiſtle Dedicatory is) to owner them ſo as to make them their adopted children; for (no doubt) they ſtrive what they can to make them their honourable Patrons pictures, and therefore may ſuite beſt with my Lord or Ladies fancy; for *Simile ſimili gaudet*, Like joyes in like; and therefore they will not loath them, but love them, highly extoll and praiſe them, and their Authors induſtry and ingenuity for them; whereas books of great power to imprint either the Theological or Moral Vertues in the ſoule, being in like manner preſented to ſome honourable view, may for the titles ſake, eſpecially for the ſubject matter, be both unregarded, and unrewarded. And what's the reaſon of this? Surely it may quickly be apprehended, the Author forgot his Patrons humour, and in it he's afraid he ſhall not finde his own picture, if he ſhould vouchſafe to give it a peruſal, no marvel then if it be rejected: For *Omne ſimile nutrit ſibi ſimile*, Like loves to nouriſh its like. Theologicall and Moral diſcourſes then ſhould be preſented to Patrons of more ſetled and diviner ſpirits, leſt the Author ſhould caſt pearles before

ſwine:

ſwine. But ſuch diſcourſes which do (as it were) diſſect or anatomize the body of faire *Venus*, and her blinde ſonne *Cupid*, are of right to be patronized by amorous and luſtful gallants: but I am afraid, that ſuch diſcourſes may be ominous to the Writers, if not the Readers, being begot when *Mars* and *Venus* were in a conjunction. Did they not prove an ominous tempeſt to *Ovid*, when for them his puniſhment was no leſſe then baniſhment? The Aſtronomers ſay too, that this conjunction of *Mars* and *Venus* enforceth raine and tempeſt; and I am ſure that theſe laſcivious pamphlets and idle ballads cannot afford either to the Writer or Reader any true comfort; carnal pleaſure for the preſent they may, but at the laſt they cauſe (as it were) a tempeſt in the conſcience, and work in the minde, trouble, vexation and grief, and that in two reſpects.

In reſpect of the { 1. Time. 2. Matter.

1. In reſpect of the *time*, becauſe 'twas loſt in penning or peruſing ſuch libidinous toyes,

toyes, for which *time* an account shall one day be given at the tribunal of Heaven, though it was not spent *nihil agendo*, yet 'twas *male agendo*; not idlely, yet evilly.

Object. *Object.* Yet you commonly say that these meditations (though on *Cupids* proportion) keep me from many worse exercises.

Answ. *Answ.* By your own confession they are bad in *gradu positivo*, so that your own mouth doth excuse you *à tanto*, but not *à toto*. I have read it written in the discommendation of that great Polititian *VIVES*, that he did spend his whole life, part in scanning, whether he should pronounce *Vergilius* or *Virgilius*, *Carthaginenses* or *Carthaginienses*, *Primus* or *Preimus*, and despising all worthy sciences and orderly course of government or rudiments; he spent the rest of his time in making filthy and lascivious Epigrams. It would be more commendable and praise-worthy both in the sight of God and man, to spend thy time upon some more serious exercises, which may tend to Gods glory, the good of thy Countrey, and the benefit of thy neighbours, and all this may end with comfort to thine own soul. *Non nobis solùm nati su-*

summus, saith the Orator.

2. In respect of the *matter*, these lascivious pamphlets and wanton ballads may become a grief and trouble to the soul; for such works in the subject matter are but folly: and would it not grieve and trouble a wise man, especially upon his death-bed, that he hath spent his precious time upon folly? Such amorous meditations are Satans snares, in which he catches the fleshly dotterels; they be that grand Impostors waters which quench the fire of zeale, which perhaps was scarce discernable before. That great Writer of lascivious folly, stiles his own meditations no better; and therefore writing his last work, (as he then intended) wherewith he resolved to solace the mindes of young men and maids, calls it *GREENS Farewell to Folly*; sure then unworthy of praise, because *Folly*: so he termes it, and so I leave it. *Rob. Green*

—— *Si mea laudas.*

Mea, yet not *mea meritoria*. *Sufficit ad meritum scire, quod non sufficiant merita.* Bern. *super Cant. Ser. 6*

Praise not thy works meritorious.

Merit, and my sinnes are (as it were) contradictories. Did I merit *per opus operatum*, I must then have wages for my work,

work, and I never read in the Scripture of any wages allowed in ſpiritual duties for the work done, but death: *The wages of ſin is death.* Could I be ſinleſſe, I could merit; had not my Saviour been ſo, he could never have merited * *ex meritocondigni*, in which my faith doth challenge an intereſt *per viam applicationis* only, no way *per viam proprietatis*; thoſe merits are not mine owne, but my Saviours by faith applied to my ſin-ſick ſoul.

* *Alſtedius diſtinct.* c.23.d.31.

My Faith muſt labour and be fruitful, and my * reward ſhall be Heaven, yet my ſmall endeavours cannot counterpoiſe that great reward; for what * proportion is there betwixt a thing finite and infinite? So farre would the one outpoiſe the other in the ſcales of Juſtice, as that there would be betwixt them an unutterable diſquiperation. Man hath Heaven *ex * dono, non ex perquiſito*, as the Lawyers ſpeak, by gift, not by purchaſe; he hath it at the end of his labours ὡς * γέρας, not ὡς μίσθος, as a voluntary gift to reward

* *Quum bonapera noſtra remunerat Deus, non merita noſtra, ſed dona ſua coronat.* Auguſt. *Quiſquis tibi enumerat merita ſua, quid tibi enumerat niſi munera tua?* Auguſt. lib. *Confeſſ.*

* *Datua, ſed quæ non debes, proportio & adſit.*
Non aliter meritum dixeris eſſe tuum.

* *Merita habere cures, habita data noveris.* Petr. *ſuper Cant.*

* γέρας ſignifies both *munus* and *præmium*, and not barely *munus*, but *munus honorarium*.

his

his temporal labours, not as wages which then ſhould be due to him from God his Maſter, having deſerved it for the works which he hath done for his benefit in his ſervice.

With what face then can I pride my ſelf up in a ſelf-conceit of merit? I muſt confeſſe that all my merit is Gods mercy, and ſo I cannot be poor in merit, as long as GOD is rich in mercy; for which I muſt have a tongue of Praiſe, whoſe object muſt be God; but I deſire not the praiſe of mans tongue, becauſe I have done *bonum*, a good work; yet I may have praiſe of God, if I have done *bonum bene*, that good work well. It is Gods work, not mine; I know no reaſon why mine own good works ſhould puffe me up, having perhaps no other ground to perſwade my ſelf that they be ſo, but the praiſe of men, (when as *ſordet in diſtinctione judicis, quod fulget in opinione operantis,*) when as thoſe good works may be ſordid in the ſentence of him who ſhould be the rewarder, which are

Nec tu elegiſti me, ſed ego elegi te, nec ut te eligerem tua merita inveni, ſed præveni: hoc eſt autem judicium inter me & te, ut tua merita non extollas, non præferas opera legis. Bern. *Ser.* 67. *ſuper Cant.*

Non bona tam penſat quàm bene facta Deus.

Deus autor eſt meriti, qui & voluntatem applicat operi, & opus applicat voluntati. Aug.

are splendant in the sight of the worker.

——*Si mea laudas.*

Mea, yet not *mea moralia.*

My morall actions or vertues in some sort, ought not to be the object of praise and commendations.

Object. But ere I proceed, me thinks I hear the plain or right Moralist intercepting me in my Meditations with his Contradictory Cavil, objecting authority to refel my position, syllogizing thus:

That which makes a man blessed, is worthy of praise;
But Vertue makes a man blessed;
Therefore Vertue is worthy of praise.

Cicero, *in Paradox.* The proposition or Major *Cicero* proves for him. *Quicquid est laudabile* (saith he) *idem & beatum videri debet:* Whatsoever is laudable, the same ought to seem blessed; and that which is blessed *entitativè*, may be so *effectivè*; that which is blessed, (no doubt) may make blessed, which is apparant in the *summum bonum.*

The

The aſſumption or *Minor* hath a *Theoreme* of a Moderne *Philoſophical Methodiſt* to back it (as it were) with armour of proof, who thus writes: It is no abſurdity to ſay or hold, that the habit of vertue (which cannot be hindered in the act) makes a man Politically bleſſed, and concludes, that in it conſiſts the chiefeſt good, the *ſummum bonum*.

Scheibler. *Philoſ. Compend.* l. 8. c. 1. *Non abſurdè dicitur, virtutis habitum, (ſi tamen talis ſit, ut non adſit impedimentum, prohibens actum) reddere hominem Politicè beatum, adeóque in eo ſummum bonum conſiſtere.*

To which I anſwer; Firſt, That this poſition or *theoreme* is not abſolute, but conditional, which condition ſtands upon two feet, *à niſi* and an *ità*; the firſt reſpects the thing, the ſecond the perſon; there's an *obſtante* in the firſt, and a *ſecundùm quid* in the ſecond. The firſt condition is, That the habit of vertue doth not make a man Politically bleſſed, unleſs it be ſuch an habit, as that there be no obſtacle, which may hinder the reduction of the habit into the act, whereby the habit is exerciſed; Now how doth Vice ſtand like a Lion in the way to hinder the actual operation of the habit of Vertue? whence it happens that many times the habit of Ver-

Vertue lies like glowing coales rak'd up in embers.

The second condition is, That though the habit of Vertue be no way hindred in the act, yet it makes a man blessed; but *Politicè tantùm*, Politically only, and that Politicall perfection of Felicity the Philosophers bound onely upon this life, and *specificè* upon the civil life only; which Felicity is so placed in *contemplatione primi boni*, in the contemplation of the first good, as that the externe good things of the world, which may fitly adde to the complement of a civil life, must not be severed from Felicity; because mans nature is not (αὐταρκὴς πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν ἄνευ τ ἐκτὸς εὐπορίας,) sufficient to contemplat without an enjoyment of the outward worldly good things; so that a man may be happy, and yet unhappy; a seeming felicity may be an Inmate in the house of his soul with a being misery, which may not be publick and apparant, till rifer death makes an entry. Just-meale-mouth'd *Absalom* and wise-politick *Achitophel* were applauded, praised, beloved, and respected for their morals, and in the vulgar judgement were deemed happy and blessed, because the in-

Arist. l. 10. Eth. c. 8.

intended justice of the one, and the pretended policies of the other were devoted to the service and good of the Weale-Publick; but really to demonstrate a seeming blessednesse, the haire of the head made one miserable, and a rope the other unhappy. Or;

Secondly, I answer, that I deny not but that true Vertue, *secundum essentiam*, is praise-worthy; which being enrobed in Morality only, was the object of praises amongst the ancient Heathen. See how *Horace* commends the just and constant man: *Resp.* 2i

Justum & tenacem propositi virum, Carm. l. 3. Ode. 3.
Non civium ardor prava jubentium,
Non vultus instantis Tyranni
Mente quatit solida: neque
Auster.

Dux inquieti turbidus Adriæ,
Nec fulminantis magna Jovis manus;
Si fractus illabatur orbis,
Impavidum ferient ruinæ.

Nor Citizens zeale commanding wicked things,

Nor threatning brow of wrathfull Tyrant-Kings.
Nor the South-winde, the chief disquieter,
Of th' Adriatick waves, nor Jupiter,
Whose potent hand moves thunder from above,
The just resolv'd, and constant man can move.
Though the worlds fabrick Heaven quite demolish,
Its fearful fall would not his heart astonish.

Thus this best of *Lyrick* Poets doth almost unbreath himself with the praises of *Pollux*, *Hercules*, *Bacchus* and *Romulus*, who were of Mortals made even immortall by two vertues especially, Constancy and justice; Such for their Morall vertues, were by Heathen writers praised and raised up *ad astra*, but we who are Christian readers know what they were.

Carm. l. 3. Ode. 2.

And see what an excellent commendation this same Poet gives Vertue but a little before in his second *Ode*.

Virtus repulſæ neſcia ſordidæ,
Intaminatis fulget honoribus,
Nec ſumit aut ponit ſecures
Arbitrio popularis auræ:

Virtus recludens immeritis mori
Cœlum, negatâ tentat iter viâ:
Cœtúſque vulgares, & udam
Spernit humum fugiente pennâ.

Repulſes or affronts.

Vertue, who ne'ere did baſe repulſes know,
Doth ſhine, beſet with taintleſſe honours ſhow,
She publick honours doth nor take, nor will,
To get applauſe, or pleaſe the vulgar will:
She op'ning Heaven to men, who endleſſe dayes
Deſerve, ſeekes paſſage through obſeſſed wayes:
She, ſcorning things which taſte of earthly leaven,
Doth ſwiftly reare her flight from earth to Heaven.

I deny not (I ſay) but that Vertue in it ſelf is praiſe-worthy, but many times the object of praiſe is blotted, being placed in a moſt vicious ſubject, who for one or two vertues may be noted, but with twenty vices may be tainted; ſo that the viciouſneſſe of the perſon or ſubject may obſcure the luſtre of his vertues, and ſo (though not cut off, yet) may curtaile (if I may ſo ſpeak) that praiſe which of right is due to them, and to him for them. And it is now become a groſſe errour in earthly men, to make him a paterne of imitation in all things, who deſerves to be followed but in one; he being the ſubject of one or a few particular vertues ſhall be made by the mop-ey'd ignorant the object of a general *encomium*.

An inſtance iu *Abſalom*, who was praiſed for his affability.

Abſalom was affable, but yet a flatterer, a traitour, a diſobedient wretch, a rebellious caitiffe, he was indeed (as *Æſchines* and *Polycrates* reported of King *Philip* of *Macedon*) *facundus & formoſus*, faire-tongu'd, and fair-fac'd; was he therefore worthy to lead the people by the eyes, as *Hercules* did by the eares?

But to draw nearer to my former aſſertion; neither the Moral, nor the Intel-

tellectual vertues can make a man the true object of praiſe abſolutely, and in all reſpects, and that for theſe foure reaſons.

Firſt, becauſe the enjoyment of them alone without the Theological vertues, cannot aſſure a man of future eternal felicity. Though they be *hominis* * *bona*, and *Dei dona*, mans goods and Gods gifts, yet they do not bring a man to the crown of glory; their poſſeſſors and open profeſſours may be, yet notwithſtanding but natural men, who are enthralled, and do homage to theſe three Tyrants, *Reaſ.* 1.

* *Sanctitas, pietas, & fides, privata ſunt bona.* Sophocles *in Thyeſte.*

The { 1. World, 2. Feſh, & 3. Devil.

to whom they are no better then bondſlaves as long as they live in the ſtate of Nature. The beſt of the Heathen, yea and the beſt of the Jewes are no better how glorious ſoever they be; Amongſt the Heathen *Æneas* was counted the moſt pious, *Plato* the moſt divine, *Ariſtides* the moſt juſt, *Ariſtotle* the moſt *In ſtatu naturæ.*

learned, *Socrates* the most vertuous, *Lucretia* the most chaste; And amongst the Jewes the Essees and the Pharisees were most devout; and amongst these, *Paul* was reputed the most fervent in zeal, unblameable, the patern of Perfection, as erroneously he judged of himself before his conversion, being blinded by the God of this World. But afterwards he saw that his fervency was but fury. All these men were admired for their vertues; but being without Christ, they were the children of wrath, *Eph.* 2. 12.

Phil. 3.

The civil and moral worldling will praise some for their good husbandry, some for their good hospitality, some for their temperance, and the like, and for these, honour them for perfect Christians; These only in the sight of the bleare-ey'd Civilian are vertues sufficient to hurry a man about the World in the chariot of Praise. *Paul* summes up a catalogue of many Worthies in an explicite commendation of their worth, yet not for any of their Moral vertues, but for one of their Theological, nominated, their faith.

Heb. 11.

Reas. 2. The second reason is; because man may be an *Aretist*, and yet an *Atheist*; he may

may enjoy theſe vertues, and yet live without God, and therefore but dead, (*ut corpus ſine anima, ſic anima ſine Deo*) his body is but the ſepulchre of a dead ſoul. If the body of man be the temple of the Holy Ghoſt, his heart muſt be the *ſanctum ſanctorum*. Induſtry and Action may adorne the Temple with the Morall and Intellectual vertues; but if divine grace doth not prepare the *ſanctum ſanctorum*, it will never be fit to entertaine the King of Kings.

Ut anima eſt vita corporis, ſic Deus eſt vita animæ.

A man may be in outward judgement compleatly vertuous, and yet he may walk but in the night of ignorance, (as it were) by the Starre-light of the Morall, and Moon-light of the Intellectual vertues, untill the Sunne of Righteouſneſſe appear upon the Horizon of his heart, and then he will perſwade himſelf, that all his before he was but pur-blinde, and do we honour the ſight of a pur-blinde man with an abſolute and perfect praiſe?

The third reaſon, becauſe theſe vertues alone may puffe up the enjoyer, and make him proud and vain-glorious. Morall vertues cannot be exerciſed without the Intellectual, becauſe they are blinde with-

Reaſ. 3.

out these; And it is not now to be noted for some new thing, that these make some arrogant, though not all. Holy writ doth enforme us that *knowledge puffeth up*; and indeed this Iron age hath so wrought with a lofty generation, as that the Learneder are not commonly the Lowlier; nay is not the proverb verified by the learned *Sophist*, which is, The poorer the prouder? Let him who was once (as it were) a Carter become a Scholar; mark how stately hee'l carry his body, like a swollen Turky-cock ruffling through a yard, and see how haughtily he will shore up his eye-lids, gogling upon his ancient poor acquaintance, as though they never knew his father; glorying so much in his breeding, as that he hath quite forgot his beginning. Such a one is like to *Paulus Samosetanus*, who went through the market-places, streets and high-wayes, vaunting publickly of his learning; or like unto *Rhemnius Palemon* the Grammarian or Pedant, who was wont to glory, that Learning was borne, and came into the world with him; and also, that with him it was like to perish.

1 Cor. 8. 1.

Fourth-

Fourthly, becauſe the vertues of the praiſed may deceave the judgement of the praiſer; for ſuperficial vertues onely may be the objects of reall praiſes: Vice ſometimes becomes vertues coate, and 'tis not diſcernable in the action, untill juſtice doth diſrobe him. *Reaſ. 4.*

Hypocriſie is a cunning craft-maſter, he can make vizards for the vices to perſonate the vertues without a ſudden diſcovery. Hypocriſie can eaſily fit a man with a Linſey-woolſey-garment; *intùs linum ſubtilitatis, extrà lanam ſimplicitatis demonſtrat*; whoſe ſubtile threed of deceit is within ſide, but the plaine web of ſimplicity without ſide; thus a man may be *ovis viſu*, but *vulpes actu*; his outſide may be of Lambes-woole, when as his inſide may be lined with Foxe-furre.

—— Si mea laudas.

Mea, yet not *mea titularia.*

A man is not the more praiſe-worthy for his greatneſſe and high titles, for good and great are not *voces convertibiles*, and commonly the higher the haughtier.

Ex-

Exeat aula,
Qui volet esse pius, virtus & summa potestas,
Non coeunt; ——— saith the Poet: Indeed the favourable aspect of a King may wring out of the inferiour an unwonted respect, though the promoted deserves this honour; just as *Haman* merited his promotion, whose pride strangled desert, before ever justice advanced him to the rope. Desert of praise doth not alwayes waite upon promotion.

—— Si mea laudas.

The Philosophers reckon praise amongst the goods of Fortune, whose object must be either man or mans, either *me* or *mea* conditionally that it may vindicate the title of good. The love of praise is *malum*, an evil, a vice; but the object of praise must be *bonum*, a good, a vertue. Evil men and their wicked works demerit the evil of disgrace, they can never be so much beholding to humane repute, or godly esteem, as to grace them with good words.

The

The Apoſtle directs a man how to attaine true praiſe; Do that which is good, and thou ſhalt have praiſe of the ſame; 'tis not the knowing, but the doing of good which reapes the benefit of praiſe. Rom. 13. 3.

Thoſe goods which are neceſſary to true felicity, ſhould be the true object of praiſes.

There is a twofold good. *Bonum* { 1. *Naturale.* 2. *Spirituale.*

Natural and Spiritual; the firſt is gotten by mans induſtrious endeavours, the ſecond cannot be obtained but by the help of divine grace. The firſt the Philoſophers divide into the goods

of { 1. The Minde. 2. The Body. 3. Fortune.

1. The goods of the Minde are Vertue and its actions.

2. The goods of the Body are Health, Strength, Beauty, the integrity of the external

external and internal ſenſes, and ſuch like endowments which do concurre to the
Ariſt. *l.* 1. Rhet. c. 5. *eucraſy* or good temperature of the body.

3. The goods of Fortune, are nobility, honour, glory, a good name, the fruitfulneſſe of the wombe, friends, liberty and riches, &c.

Theſe goods (they ſay) are neceſſary
Ariſt. *l.* 1. Eth. *c.* 10. to the enjoyment of felicity in this life, the goods of the minde ὡς κυρια, as eſſentials to happineſſe; the goods of the Body and of Fortune do ſecundarily only pertain to Felicity, *non ad fœlicitatis eſſentiam, ſed integritatem*, the one be its inſtruments, the other its ornaments. But the Spiritual and Theological goods of a man are thoſe three divine Siſters,

viz.
1. Faith,
2. Hope, &
3. Charity.

Theſe three work a man into the true and eternal happineſſe. The natural goods may and ought to be praiſed in a man,

man, but ony κατά τι, as we commend him who doth *bonum*, a good thing, in reſpect of him who doth an action indifferent, we approve of it with a *So, So:* But the ſupernatural good things may and ought to be commended ἁπλῶς, becauſe the Agent hath done *bonum bene*, a good thing well. The eſſence of Felicity doth conſiſt in the habit of Vertue κατὰ κτῆσιν, but in the operation of it κατὰ χρῆσιν, ſaith *Ariſtotle*; and this is as true of the Theological, as of the Moral vertues; for it is not the having, but the doing which crownes; not he that can, but he that doth run, obtaineth the prize and praiſe too, if he be *faithful unto the death*, hold out to the end of the race. Theſe divine vertues make a man like * *Noah*, to be juſt and perfect; and like * *Job*, to be perfect and upright; and like * *Zacharias* and *Elizabeth*, to be righteous before God, walking in all the Commandments of the Lord, blameleſſe, blameleſſe *ſine querela, non ſine culpa*; without eruption, not without corruption; blameleſſe before men, yet not ſinleſſe

Loco ſupradicto.

* Gen. 6.
* Job 1.
* Luke 1.

leſſe before God. The Saints perfections are not ſo full, but they may fall; as long as duſt and aſhes are cloth'd with mortality, they may be *mundi*, yet are ſtill *mundandi*; clean, yet to be cleanſed. The Saints are in this world partially, but not gradually perfect; perfect *ſecundùm inventionem, non ſecundùm pervention em*; in regard of intention, contention, or endeavours; but not in regard of pervention, or performance; and therefore the foot of it doth reſt upon Earth, but the height of it is reſerved for Heaven.

This is but one degree of their *encomium*, that they were juſt and perfect; the very height of it was, that they were ſo in their generation: *Noah* was a juſt man in his generation; not a juſt man as juſt men went in thoſe dayes, (that were a poor praiſe for ſo worthy a Patriarch, but he was a juſt man in that generation, wherein the world was over-growne with wickedneſſe, ſo he was juſt, *non juxta conſummatam juſtitiam, ſed juxta juſtitiam generationis ſuæ*, ſaith St. *Hierome*: *Quæſt. in Gen.*

Heſiod deſcribes five ſorts of ages, and that which is the laſt and worſt, is that we now live in, the Iron age.

Not

Νῦν γὰρ δὴ γένος ἐστὶ σιδήρεον.--- Heſiod. ἔργ. βιβ. 1.

Iron indeed conſidering the people who live in this age, a *wicked*, *perverſe*, and *crooked generation*; and for a man to ſhine as a light in thd midſt of this naughty and perverſe Nation, is worthy of praiſe indeed. *Eſſe malum inter bonos culmen pravitatis, eſſe bonum inter malos culmen pietatis*; as to be diſſolute amongſt the good, is the height of pravity; ſo to be good and upright amongſt the wicked, is the height of piety: ſo that I may ſay with *Seneca* that in this age *Magna pietas eſt nihil impiè facere*: It is great piety to refrain from impiety. *Martial* highly commends *Nerva*, that he could (nay that he dared to) be godly and good in a wicked Court:

John 9. 5.
Phil. 2. 5.

Nunc licet & fas eſt, ſed tu ſub principe duro,
Temporibúſq; malis auſus es eſſe bonus.

Mart. l. 12. Epig. 6.

Thus you ſee what Vertues ought to be the abſolute objects of humane praiſes; but before I leave the object, I'le give the foundation upon which praiſes are to be built,

built, and that is juſtice, according to *Cicero's* teſtimony: *Fundamentum perpetuæ commendationis & famæ eſt juſtitia, ſine qua nihil eſſe poteſt laudabile*: The foundation of perpetuall commendation and fame is juſtice, without which nothing can be laudable. The object muſt be that good which is worth commendations, whether it be *in* { 1. *Amicis.* aut 2. *Inimicis.* in friend or foe, the end is to give to { God, his glory. Man, his due.

— *Si mea laudas.*

* 1 Chron. 15. 14. * 2 Chron. 25. 2. * 2 Chron. 27. 2.

Omnia. —

Men muſt be ſo praiſed, as that their vices be not approved; ſo was * *Aſa*, * *Amazia*, and * *Joatham* commended. To praiſe *mea* is charity; but to praiſe *mea omnia*, may be flattery, and that may puffe up, & a puffing up precedes a plucking down. *Herods* eloquent Oration forced that *ſupphemy* or *fauſtam acclamationem* from the people with a *vox Dei non hominis*, the voice of God, and not of man, which

ſwelled

swelled him with pride, giving not the glory to God by punishing those *Sycophants*, of whose vanity he complained, when he was even ready to yield up his body to dust and ashes, (as *Josephus* reports;) but the wormes took possession of his body, before time came, that sins Atturney, death did deliver it to them in the grave. *Ignatius* took care, lest he should be taken with flattering praises, lest they should *inflare*, puffe him up, and that was but *Flagellare*, to wound him.

Flagellantes enim me flagellant. Ign. *in Ep.*

—*Laudat.*

Laudas tu, but *Qualis tu?*

No great matter, for *Quis tu?* The quality of the praiser is more to be regarded then the person; for good men will praise good men, and bad men will praise bad men, and therefore *Antisthenes* the *Athenian* being told that he was praised of certaine wicked men, said, *Vereor, ne quid imprudens fecerim mali.* I fear, lest that I have unwittingly done some evil; thinking that none are praised of evil men, but for evil actions.

— Laudas.

But *Quomodo?*

Euripides saith, ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐν θανοῦσι λάμπει, Vertue shines in good men when they be dead; and therefore *Pescennius Niger* being called from the Army to the Empire, said to one who wrote a Panegyrick in his praises for his worthy acts, Write the praises of *Marius*, and of *Hannibal*, and of some other worthy deceased Captains, whom we imitate; and as for my self, *placere vivus, mortuus etiam laudari volo*; I will (whil'st I live) please; when I am dead be praised, and good reason too: For,

Pascitur in vivis liver, post fata quiescit:
Tunc suus ex merito quemq; tuetur honos. saith *Ovid.*

Wicked sure is that man, who sticks not (yet the worlds custome is, though wicked,) to praise his neighbour being dead, whom he fought to spoile being living; so prone to mischievous dissimulation is mans minde, as that he who is now (*in humo*) shrined in dust, shall be the object of praise; who when he was (*homo*) cloth'd with mortality, was the object of malice. It is the complaint of a moderne Poet:

Ludi-

Laudimus insontes vivos, laudamus eosdem
Defunctos: O mors candida! vita nigra!

We praise them dead, whom without cause in breath
We hurt; Thou 'rt black, O Life! thou 'rt white, O Death!

Thus Death makes him precious in our tongues, whom Life esteemed pernicious in our thoughts.

—*Laudi.*

But *Cui?*

To whom dost thou praise a neighbour? if to his enemy, he'le hate him the more; if to his friend, perhaps self-conceit may make him so jealous of his own reputation, as that he thinks, that doth derogate from his own worth, which is attributed to the worth or merit of his friend. Indeed Envy now adayes is the greatest, and frequentest enemie to Worth's preferment: It is deafe to all praises, but now to its own; if praise do not flatter it, it will please it self with self-praises: Malice, especially chaired in honour hath no eares to hear the praises of an inferiour, nor yet Charity to excuse the unadvised errours

Laus in ore proprio sordescit.

of the (otherwiſe) well-deſerving; nor yet patience to bear with the weakneſſe of inferiour Worthies. An inſtance in this we have in the Romane Tribunes; for when *Caſo* the ſon of *L. Quintius*, ſurnamed *Concinnatus*, had incurred the hatred and diſpleaſures of the Tribunes, by carrying himſelf as a profeſſed enemy to popular proceedings, and thereby had endangered his life; They would not hear of his worthineſſe and knowing deſervings, the alledging of which incenſed them the more, whereby they became the more cruel, like a Beare robbed of her whelps; they hunted the more eagerly after his blood, which his father perceiving, and being directed by a better diſcerning wiſdome, (as it were) then the reſt of his Advocates, he chuſeth out a path (for his ſonnes ſafety) contrary to that which they had trod, omits the recital of his merits, as things not fitting to be ſeen of a diſtempered ſight, and indeed not to be endured of Envy; acknowledgeth a fault, and in that regard with great inſtancy deſires the people (in humble and ſubmiſſive termes) to bear with the weakneſſe of his yeares, and not to urge the forfeiture of his unadviſed errour. Thus better it was

to

to confeſſe an errour, then to alledge merit. A man therefore ought to beware and conſider to whom he praiſeth a neighbour.

Quid de quoque viro, & cui, dicas, ſæpè caveto:

Is a remembrance to a praiſer, as well as to a detractour.

Obſerve what man thy hearer is, and ſee,
The nature of thy praiſes what they be.

—Laudas.

We muſt honour our neighbours by the Apoſtles injunction, and that *ore*, by our mouth; and ſo by praiſing their real worth we honour our deſerving neighbours by our lips: Praiſe is honour, *qui oratione fit*, or according to *Ariſtotle*, λόγῳ ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος τῆς ἀρετῆς, a ſpeech ſhewing the greatneſs of Vertue, or an honour which is given to a man of worth by words Panegyrical, or encomiaſtick ſpeeches; and we muſt honour them too by defending their reputation againſt the malevolous aſperſions of the venemous tongues of detractours, who endeavour to derogate ſomewhat from their

1 Pet. 2. 17

Rhet. lib. 1 c. 9.

worth by calumny. Satan who is called διάβολος, an accuser or slanderer, is an expert seed-man, he takes great pleasure in sowing the seed of Envy in mans heart, which beares the black-rotten fruit of detraction.

If the fire of passion do but once smother under the wet straw of malice, time will stay but the drying; occasion shall fire it, opportunity shall finde a tongue to vent it, a calumnious aspersion shall be a requital of a received affront, or (but) conceived displeasure; so proclive to revenge is the minde of man, and sometimes so insatiable, as that it cannot quench its thirst, no not though it be drunk with blood; a man then who can truly vindicate the title of a friend, will vindicate the cause of his wronged absent friend, by a defence of his reputation against the malicious and viperous brood of back-biters.

——*Laudas.*

Nay we muſt be praiſers, or we ſhall be detractours; if we maliciouſly conceale the good which is in our neighbour, we do detract from his fame and worth * indirectly, though not directly, according to *Aquinas*.

——*Laudas.*

The Greek word for praiſe may afford us a point of learning, which may not be baulked or overpaſſed without notice; ἐπαινῶ they derive from ἐπαίνυμαι, *ſuſcipio*, to undertake. Indeed praiſe doth undertake two things very happily, and a third by the by,

viz. { 1. *Animare*, 2. *Honorare*, 3. *Onerare*.

1. *Animare.*] To hearten and encourage the praiſed, or the auditor to an imitation of the praiſeds vertues, or to a chearful progreſſion in that good which is

* *Fama hominis diminuitur* { *vel* 1. *Directè*. 2. *Indirectè*.

1. *Directè, vel*
per { 1 *Impoſitionem falſi*. 2. *Aggravationem peccati*. 3. *Revelatio occulti*. 4. *Relationem boni, vel veri malè intentionc.*

2. *Indirectè,*
vel { 1. *Bonum alterius negando.* 2. *Malitioſè bonum reticendo, vel minuendo.* Aquinas.

ſo commendable; *Laudare eſt acerrimus ſtimulus movendi*, ſaith *Pliny*. Praiſe is a ſharp goad, which rouſeth up the dull ſpirit to an agility in action: So the Poet,

——*Immenſum gloria calcar habet.*

Cicer. Tuſc: Qu. lib. 3. Aug. Glory (which is *conſentiens laus bonorum de excellente virtute bene judicantium*, as *Cicero* ſaith; or *frequens de aliquo fama cum laude*, (as another hath it,) which is alwayes joyned with praiſe, is like a ſpur which ſtirreth up the ſpirits to operation, when they begin to be defective in the exerciſes of good.

2. *Honorare.*] Praiſe doth honour the well-doer; and honour is *præmium virtutis*, a reward of vertue, which is given to a good man, that others by his example may be ſtirred up to the practice of vertuous duties.

3. *Onerare.*] To burden a man with pride and vain-glory, and that is the worſt office that praiſe can do. It was part of *Ignatius* his ſtudies to finde out a meanes how to beware and eſchew his praiſes, (*ne temerè inflarent*,) leſt they raſhly ſwell him with the tympany of pride.

——*Laudat.*

What profit is it for a man to be bandied

bandied up and down in the Tennis-Court of this World with the Racket of Praise? sure none to the praised; all the the benefit lights upon the praiser. Praise like a stone thrown against a wall rebounds upon the head of the caster; *Bonum laudare non tam laudato, quàm laudantibus prodest*; the good of praise profits the praiser more then the praised.

As praise and worldly applause should not transport a man out of himself by accesse of joy, and excesse of self-conceit; so neither should dispraise and *mundane* disgrace deject him so much as cause him either to torment his minde with restlesse fancies, or careless choler, or melancholy passions, or to period his resolves by desperation; for anothers dispraise cannot annihilate the object, neither can praise coronize the praised. Praise followes Vertue, but as the shadow doth the body.

Contemnit laudem virtus, licèt usq; sequatur
Gloria virtutem, corpus ut umbra suam.
Est etenim virtus aliquid, nil gloria, sicut
Est aliquid corpus, corporis umbra nihil.

Owen. Epig. lib. 3. Epig. 13.

Vertue doth praise contemne, though't doth embrace.

Its

Its ſteps, as ſhadow doth the body trace.
Like as mans body, ſo ſubſtance Vertue's deem'd;
But like the ſhadow, praiſe is naught eſteem'd.

The conſideration of this may move a man to recollect his ſaddeſt thoughts and troubled ſpirits, even in the midſt of melancholy dumps, and worldly troubles, and ſo meditate on the worlds inconſtancy.

To conclude then: I have little ſought to winde my ſelf into the worlds favour, ſince I have experienced its fickleneſſe; they onely who are its white-boyes, temporizers now adayes are the moſt deeply imprinted in its books, and are in moſt eſteem and repute with worldly men. Let the world frowne upon a man, and it ſhall be a ſure attractive for flatterers and praiſers; but let it once frown, and that is as ſure an inſtructive for detractors; then away haſte friends, whoſe place is ſoon poſſeſſed with fiends, tormentours, gibers, flowters. Experience taught *Ovid* the brittleneſſe of a friends love, which directed his Muſe to warmble out this diſciplinary diſtich:

Donec

Donec eris fœlix, multos numerabis amicos,
Nullus ad amissas ibit amicus opes.

Friends are not scarce, as long as riches hold:
When wealth is fled, no friends can then be told.

To the very same purpose too writes a Poet of our dayes. *Owen.*

Te bona dum splendet fortuna, sequuntur amici,
Ut te, dum lucet sol, solet umbra sequi:
Quam primùm liquidus nebulis offunditur aër,
Ecce repentè tuum deserit umbra latus.

Whil'st Fortunes Sun doth shine, thou'st friends good store,
When Sun is set, thy shadow's seen no more;
When as dark clouds from sight obscure the Sun,
Behold, how soon thy shadowe's fled and gone.

ESSAY. VII.

Of Errours in Readers.

And therein somewhat of { Flattery, Envy, or, Detraction.

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7. *Omnia stultitiam, si nihil, invidiam.*

Qui legis ista, tuam reprehendo, si mea laudas Omnia, stultitiam, si nihil, invidiam.

I am now fallen upon the tongue.

Nobile lingua bonum, mobile lingua malum.

IT was both the best and worst dish, which *Æsop* could present to his Master; It is my fortune now to present you with one bad enough, an unfit dish to intrude it self into a banquet; I must dresse, yet am no curious Cook; but 'tis my comfort, many a palate-pleasing dish hath been

been cook't by a ſloven.

——*Si mea laudas*

Omnia, ſtultitiam, ſi nihil, invidiam.

To praiſe *Omnia ex paucis*, that's folly; and that folly is flattery; but to praiſe *nihil ex omnibus*, that's envy. To free the Reader then from the ſuſpition both of flattery and envy, he may praiſe a few of all, not all of a few; for what man can be ſo exquiſite in his meditations, as that every word ſhould (like the leaſt filings of Gold,) have its weight.

——*Si mea laudas.*

Omnia.——

I may liken our flattering Readers to our flattering Church-Wardens, for as theſe put in their bills, ſo they in their Cenſures thruſt in an *Omnia bene.*

There is an herbe called *lingua pagana*, horſe-tongue, or double-tongue; the devil that crafty gardiner hath got a ſlip of it, and hath ſet it in the heart of the Gnathonical Reader; the effects of it are dangerous, for the juyce of it being drunk by the honeſt Reader, may be as hurtful to him,

him, as hemlock is to the chicken. *Bilinguis* was none of Gods making, it was the devils marring, he loves to make that double which God made ſingle.

The Readers cloven tongue hath a great relation to his polt-footed judgement, and that makes him ſo unſetled in his opinion, as that he will diſallow of that in the Writers abſence, which before he did approve of, and commend in his preſence; ſuch an one is worſe then a *Zoilus* or a *Momus*; for like a cowardly curre, he will fawn in a mans face, but bite him by the ſhins, when his turn'd back hath given the farewell.

He is like the Swan; for his words, like her feathers, are as white as the glorious Lilly; but his heart, like her fleſh, is blacker then quenched coales. If for this cauſe
Lev. 11. 18 the children of *Iſrael* were forbidden to feed on the Swan, ſhall I be ſo greedy of praiſe as to choke my ſelf with the tickling, glorious words of her Embleam.

——*Si nihil, invidiam.*

Envy is mother to detraction; no marvell then if the daughter be entertained, where the mother hath her welcome.

The

The envious Reader is now become the Writers rider, he rides like death upon a pale horſe, called Envy, who knowes no other pace then a falſe gallop. Envy comes to the Reader (like a lover) with a preſent in her hand, to wooe him to a cenſure; Detraction is her preſent, and Malice ſtirres up the hand to receive it. She doth Metamorphoſe the Reader from *Lector* to *Lictor*, a beaſt which *Geſner* never heard of; who like the butchers dog, ſo long ſnarles at the Writers credit, as that at length he bites off his good name; like the *Peloponneſian* Phyſician at *Rome*, he may be called *Lanius vulnerarius*, a killing butcher, ſo near is φθόνος to φόνος, in ſound, Envy to murther, as that they would equivocate without a *Schematical Epenthefis*. The detractour is borne (as one ſaid of *Dionyſius*) to pride and cruelty; pride makes him to inſult over the Writers labours, and to condemne them to the fire; and cruelty makes him commend his judgement, and caſt them into the flames.

Bonaventure calls the Detractor, *Lanioſus canis*, the Butchers Dog.

'Tis a quaint conceit of one, yet true: That the word *Detractio* begins with a *D*, and ends with *O*; it begins with the Devil, for he is the firſt mover or inſtigatour

tour to Detraction; but it ends with *O, Orcus*, Hell is his end. When *Iezebel* took away her neighbour *Naboths* vineyard, little did she think that her *blood* should be the *price* of it, and that her body should ere long give the dogs a break-fast; and when a man doth take away a neighbours good name by vilifying his person, or the labour of the person with ignominious words; he little thinks (it seemes) that without repentance and restitution, eternall flames in hell shall one day banquet both with his body and soule. Now as *Augustus Cæsar* spake of *Galba's* crooked back, so say I to my envious censorious Reader: *Ego monere te possum, corrigere non possum*; Admonition, not correction belongs to me, but if he amends not, the Lord will plague him, because he hath not εὐδοκίαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, good will towards his neighbour: for the Lord (like that Romane Emperour) *Odit pallidos & macilentos*, he abhorres such as are lean with envy, and pale with malicious wickednesse. The Lord keep me from such malicious and uncharitable Readers; wherefore I pray with our Church:

From

From hatred, malice, and all uncharitableness, Good Lord deliver me.

Si nihil invidiam.

Can a man be ἄγλωσσος yet ἀγέρεως, can he be mouthlesse, and yet an uncharitable detractour? Indeed he is not reproved so much, because he doth *nihil dicere*, but because he doth *nihil laudare*. It is not the silent Reader, but the silent Praiser who is the subject of Envy, and therefore the worthy object of Reprehension; 'tis true that the silent Reader, if he harbour Envy in his bosome, though he utter it not, is a Politick though *tacite*, and yet secret detractour; *Gravis est rapacitas, cum veram alterius gloriam, & sine dacio non corrumpis, silentio tamen celeris.* He is an envious thief who passeth by the true worth of another in silence, as well as he who falsly corrupts it with lies, and therefore this silent Detractor doth peccare in Dei { 1. *Bonitatem.* / 2. *Gloriam.* } Sin against Gods { 1. Goodnesse. / 2. Glory. }

Detractio est denigratio alienæ famæ per occulta verba. Aquinas.

1. Against the goodnesse of God; *quia omnia hominis bona sunt Dei dona*; because all the graces, good things and vertues which are in a man, are Gods gifts, and sparkes of the infinite treasure of his bottomlesse bounty; now to seek by our silence to suppresse the same, what is it else but to offer injury to God, and to raise out his goodnesse, and so much as is possible to obscure his Godhead, who is altogether and nothing but goodnesse?

2. Against Gods glory; *quia opera bona hominis sunt pars Dei gloriæ*; because the good works of man are part of Gods glory, *Matth.* 5. 16. *Let your light so shine before men, that they seeing your good works may glorifie your Father which is in Heaven.*

Therefore to seek by silence to obscure the vertues of any, what is it else but to labour to put out the light which God would have to shine unto the world, and so to shew our selves enemies to Gods glory?

——*Si nihil invidiam.*

I may very well reckon the turbulent *Schismatick* amongst these *si nihil*, sect-detractours; who do *Ecclesiæ famam detrahere*, give the Church an ill report;

they

they hold *fanum* to be *profanum*, because in it assemble *nefandi*, as well as *fandi*, a particolloured Congregation like *Ioseph's* coat, and therefore they serve it as *Ioseph's* brethren did his garment, rent it asunder by foule-mouth'd detraction; for this purpose serves their private conventicles, they love *Ædem* better then *Ædes*, a Chamber better then a Church; and therefore a private conventicle more then a publick convocation. Finde a Parish in *England* free from these detractours, and it may well be chronicled.

——*Si nihil, invidiam.*

I may very well commemorate an Epilogue written some few yeares since by an ancient divine, to such scholars amongst us, who by their places in our Church, (and in respect of the treasure they receive out of her dowry) ought to defend our writings against Schismes and Heresies, and not underhand, and in corners to suggest evil against us, for strengthening the hands of the factious, their private favourites.

In Seignior *Ambo.*

Sir Ambo *takes a penſion of his mother,*
But ſees the fugitive that calls her whore,
To vs one hand, to him he gives the other
A prodytor behinde, a friend before.
But mark whilſt he thus doth himſelfe delight.
Both ſides do dandle him for an Hypocrite.

In Seignior *Dry-pate.*

Sir Dry-pate *reads and carps, and hems and ſpits,*
No marvel though he have purg'd out his wits;
For little 'twas when will was at the full,
And yet 'tis true, he hath no little ſkull.

In quendam *Fig-fag.*

See, ſee how Fig-fag *ſtirres, and moves and ſtrouts,*
Hearke, hearke the ſilly Syre how trim he flouts;
Boyes, girles and fooles applaude him for ſome body;
But yet his carps do prove him but a noddy.

In

In homunculum *Snuffe.*

Sniffe-snuffe *must judge, not knowing what it meant,*
For barley broth is Snuffs *chief element;*
Put him besides the cushion of his cup,
And all his liquid sense is dried up.
But lance no further busie-bodies tumour,
For every foole must needs be in his humour.

—Reprehendo, si mea laudas
Omnia, stultitiam, si nihil, invidiam.

To conclude, I may not unfitly compare my Readers braine to a Sea, in which the little pinnace of his judgement will be floating; but he hath two dangerous rocks like *Sylla* and *Charybdis* to passe through, between which the passage is but narrow, and against which he may easily suffer shipwrack, if discretion do not guide him to entertaine a sober and steddy Pilot; on his right hand is descried the Rock of Flattery, on his left hand the Rock of Envy; if he keep the Channel of Charity, he shall be possessed of the Mean, which may challenge a Golden Epithete.

Kinde Reader, keep a Mean in thy censures,

sures, and I blame thee not; if otherwise, if thou beest mother curious or adulatorious, I must check, though't be by the leave of this my Poet, applying his mind whilst to thy curious Critical judgement.

Qui legis ista, tuam, reprehende, si mea laudas
Omnia, stultitiam si nihil, invidiam.

Reader, if thou do'st praise what e're I ave writ,
I must (perforce) rebuke thy flattering wit;
If thou approv'st of nought in all my book,
I must reprove thy heart, 'tis envies crooke.

FINIS.